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In the course of catching-up, Vietnam faces risks in two sectors: in real sector and in 
financial sector. In this paper we focus mostly on risk in real sector: the risk of getting 
stuck in middle-income trap. Vietnam is still far lagged behind her neighbors and much 
more further to developed economies. Does the economic paradigm that Vietnam follows 
in  the  last  two  decades  allow  her  to  catch  up  with  those  economies?  We  show  that 
Vietnam’s economic growth in the last two decades based essentially on cheap but low 
skill  labor  and  physical  capital.  Participation  in  international  and  regional  production 
network probably lock Vietnam in low-tech position, hence low value added. If Vietnam 
keeps on growing in present paradigm, hardly can it catch up the neighboring economies.  
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Is Vietnam economic paradigm sustainable for catch up  
1  Introduction  
The  Doimoi  process  has  been  launched  out  in  1986  when  it  represented  an 
irreversible change in ideology. The Sixth Party Congress in December 1986 publicly 
rejected  the  fiction  of  trying  to  implement  the  central  planning  model,  and  instead 
declared its intention to move toward some form of mixed market economy (a multi-
sector, market-oriented economy) with a role for the private sector to compete with the 
state in non-strategic sectors. This included agreement on the need for policy reforms 
aimed at reducing macroeconomic instability and accelerating economic growth, and that 
all  economic  levers  (price,  wages,  fiscal  and  monetary  policies)  were  to  be  used  to 
achieve these objectives.  
However, significant changes in this direction occurred only sometimes after the 
approval of the Doimoi (Renovation) program by the Congress
3. In March of 1989, Viet 
Nam  adopted  a  radical  and  comprehensive  reform  package  aimed  at  stabilizing  and 
opening  the  economy,  and  enhancing  freedom  of  choice  for  economic  units  and 
competition so as to change fundamentally its economic management system.  
In  parallel  with  the  economic  reforms,  the  acceleration  of  the  process  of 
international  economic  integration  has  played  a  key  role  in  enhancing  efficiency  and 
promoting economic growth. So far Viet Nam has entered into trade agreements with 
about 60 countries and has trade relations with some 170 countries. In 1992, Vietnam 
signed  a  trade  agreement  with  the  European  Union  (EU).  In  1995,  Vietnam  joined 
ASEAN and  committed to fulfill the agreements under the AFTA by 2006. Vietnam 
applied for WTO membership in 1995 and expected to be a member by the end of 2006. 
In 1998, Vietnam became a member of the APEC. In 2000, Vietnam signed the Bilateral 
Trade  Agreement  with  the  United  States  and  the  agreement  became  effective  in 
December 2001. Most recent, Vietnam has also joined regional integration clubs such as 
ASEAN - China Free Trade Area (2002) and ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (2003). These reforms have created a huge market access for Vietnamese 
entrepreneurs and played a key role in booming of exports which is the main engine for 
growth in Vietnam.  
                                                 
3 Viet Nam’s Land Law of 1988, “Party Resolution 10,” April 1988  abandoned the collective farming 
system that had been introduced in the 1960s; Resolution 27/HĐBT of March and Decision 16/NQTƯ of 
July 1988 officially encourage private enterprises; Law on foreign Investment 1987 to call for foreign 
investment.    
  2 
These macroeconomic reforms have significantly changed the face of Vietnam’s 
economy and society. In 1989 inflation was under control and since then it has gradually 
stood at a low rate
4. From 1990 to 1997, the GDP growth rate was maintained at around 8 
percent per annum on average. The GDP growth rate, however, went down between 1997 
and  1999,  partly  because  of  the  Asian  financial  crisis,  and  partly  because  of  the 
dissipation of reform effects. Since 2000, the economy has regained its fairly high growth 
rate, 7 percent and more per annum (Figure 4). 
Successful  economic  development  has  resulted  in  overall  improvement  of 
people’s welfare and significant poverty reduction irrespective of measurement methods. 
The total poverty incidence declined from about 70% by the end of the 1980s to 58 
percent in 1993, 37% in 1998 and further to 13.4 percent in 2009. Vietnam has also 
achieved notable results in human development. There has been a significant increase in 
Vietnam’s human development index (HDI) (from 0.623 in 1994 to 0.689 in 2001 and to 
0.731 in 2005).  
 Studies about the Doi moi process in Vietnam seem to agree that the success of 
economic  renovation  in  Vietnam  bases  on  two  pillars:  (i)  gradually  self-transforming 
economic  structure  from  central  planning  to  market-oriented;  (ii)  and  pro-active 
international  economic  integration.  Arkadie,  B.  and  R.  Mallon  (2003),  Vo  Tri  Thanh 
(2005),  ADB  (2006)…  essentially  emphasize  on  the  role  of  institutional  changes  in 
development process and consent that the main engines of economic growth in Vietnam 
in the last two decades are exports and capital accumulation in which foreign capital 
plays an important role. Undoubtedly, Vietnam has benefited enormously from increased 
access to the world markets for its exports and growing FDI inflows. The economy has 
consecutively grown at high rates since Doimoi 1986. 
In the course of catching-up, Vietnam faces risks in two sectors: in real sector and 
in financial sector. The risk in financial sector was studied thoroughly by Vo T.T and 
Pham C.Q (2008). Hence, in this paper we focus mostly on risk in real sector: the risk of 
getting stuck in middle-income trap. Vietnam is still far lagged behind her neighbors and 
much more further to developed economies. Does the economic paradigm that Vietnam 
follows in the last two decades allow her to catch up with those economies? Why in Asia, 
Japan,  South  Korea  and  Taiwan  have  successfully  upgraded  economies  to  the  high 
income  level  while  South  East  Asian  economies  such  as  Thailand,  Malaysia,  and 
Indonesia … seem getting stuck at middle-income level. 
                                                 
4 In 2004 inflation rate (measured by CPI) increased considerably, to 9.5% from the low rates during 2000-
03.  
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Economic literature proves that the crucial factor to sustainable growth and cath-
up is technological progress. The Solow (1956) based on the classical  assumption of 
diminishing returns to capital, states that without continuing improvement of technology 
per  capita  growth  must  eventually  cease.  The  essential  factor  for  economic  growth, 
namely technological progress, is however, exogenous to the model. This shortcoming 
inspires  scholars  such  as  Romer  (1986,  1987,  1990),  Lucas  (1988),  Rebelo  (1991), 
Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992) and many others to develop 
new "endogenous" growth models which provide more insight into the Solow.s residual. 
The  endogenous  growth  models  by  taking  human  capital  accumulation,  learning-by-
doing, research and development (R&D), and knowledge spillover in economic growth 
into account are able to generate long-term per-capita growth endogenously.  
Recently, the spectacularly rapid growth of many Asian economies, especially the 
East Asian newly industrialized economies (NIEs) gave rise to a broad and diversified 
literature aiming at explaining the reasons for such a long lasting period of expansion 
(Kim and Lau [1994, 1996], Krugman [1994], Rodrik [1995], Worldbank [1993], Young 
[1994,  1995]).  All  these  economies  have  experienced  rapid  growth  of  their  physical 
capital stock and very high rate of investment in human capital. 
On one hand, the supporters of the accumulation view stress the importance of 
physical and human capital accumulation in the Asian growth process. Accordingly, the 
main engine of "miracle growth" in NIEs is simply, very high investment rates. Young 
[1994, 1995], Kim and Lau [1994, 1996] found that the postwar economic growth of the 
NIEs was mostly due to growth in input factors (physical capital and labor) with trivial 
increase  in  the  total  factor  productivity.  Moreover,  the  hypothesis  of  no  technical 
progress  cannot  be  rejected  for  the  East  Asian  NIEs  (Kim  and  Lau  [1994]). 
Consequently, accumulation of physical and human capital seems to explain the lion’s 
share of the NIEs growth process. Krugman [1997] wrote that Larry  Lau and Alwyn 
Young works suggested that Asian growth could mostly be explained by high investment 
rates, good education and the movement of underemployment peasants into the modern 
sector. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  supporters  of  endogenous  growth  theory  pinpoint 
productivity growth as the key factor of East Asian success. According to these authors, 
Asian  countries  have  adopted  technologies  previously  developed  by  more  advanced 
economies (assimilation view) and "the source of growth in a few Asian economies was 
their ability to extract relevant technological knowledge from industrial economies and 
utilize it productively within domestic economy" (Pack [1992]). They admit that high  
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rates  of  investment  into  physical  and  human  capital  is  necessary  to  achieve  high 
economic growth rate. However, as stressed by Nelson and Pack (1998) there is nothing 
automatic in learning about, in risking to operate and, in coming to master technologies 
and other practices that are new to the economy. These processes require searching and 
studying,  learning,  and  innovating  to  master  modern  technologies  and  new  practices. 
Thereby, the economy enhances its stock of knowledge and efficiency. Implicitly, they 
suggest that technological progress exist and does play a crucial role in NIEs economic 
growth. Empirically, Collins and Bosworth [1996] or Lau and Park [2003] show Total 
Factor Productivity (TFP) gains actually matter in Asian NIEs growth and that future 
growth  can  be  sustained.  More  precisely,  Lau  and  Park  (2003)  show  there  was  no 
technical  progress  for  Hong  Kong,  Korea,  Singapore,  Taiwan,  Indonesia,  Malaysia, 
Thailand  until  1985.  However,  in  period  1986-1995  technological  progress  evidently 
contributes  to  economic  growth  in  these  economies.  For  Western  Germany,  United 
Kingdom, France, and Japan, technical progress always existed. 
Cuong Le Van and Tu Anh Nguyen (2010) shows that high saving rates may play 
an important role in "miracle growth" in NIEs in the short and mid terms, especially, in 
transitional stage (catching-up stage) the high saving rate induces high growth rate of 
output. However, in the long term, the effect of high saving rate dies out and only total 
factor productivity (TFP) is the crucial factor of growth as claimed by Krugman.  
Hence, if Vietnam economic paradigm fails to enhance its productivity, Vietnam 
will really be in risk of getting into middle income trap. In this paper we first examine 
Vietnam economic paradigm in framework of “Flying geese paradigm”. Secondly, the 
weakness and potential risks of the paradigm in an increasingly uncertain environment 
will be pointed out. Finally, we propose policy recommendation to minimize those risks. 
2  Vietnam economic Paradigm 
2.1  A brief description of the “Flying geese paradigm” 
In the overall, the development paradigm of East Asian economies, including first 
tier NIEs and second tier NIEs
5, is akin to “flying geese paradigm” that Akamatsu firstly 
described  in  1930s  and  published  in  1961.  In  this  section  we  briefly  describe  the 
paradigm and show that it fit well with growth path of Vietnam’s economy in the last two 
decades.  Thereby,  the  weakness  and  risks  of  Vietnam  economic  paradigm  could  be 
highlighted.  
                                                 
5 First tier NIEs are South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong; Second tier NIEs are Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.    
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The paradigm has accurately depicted the East Asian catching-up process. The 
paradigm presupposes the existence of hierarchy, with a dominant economy acting as the 
growth centre and followed by other developing economies. The followers in pursuits of 
development emulate the industries of advanced economies in a manner compatible with 
its own factors and technological endowments at a given specific times. Accordingly, in 
the course of industrial development the followers experience three stages of catching-up: 
Exporting primary commodities and importing foreign goods and capital. At this 
stage cheap imported goods benefit domestic customers but impoverish the local 
producers. The competition from foreign goods instigates local producers to learn 
and buy technology to produce those imported goods domestically. 
Substituting imports: At this stage, local producers who acquire know-how and 
sufficient capital start producing import-substituted goods,  and  gradually  drive 
foreign exporters out local market. 
Exporting: Local production increases further to extent that excessively produced 
goods to be exported.   
The  figure  1  depicts  the  sequence  of  industrial  upgrading  in  a  developing 
economy that originally predicted by the paradigm. The sequence described in figure 1 
can be applied for consumption goods and capital goods. The economy starts up with 
consumption goods then capital goods. At initial stage, a developing economy produces 
crude  commodities  (mining  and  quarrying,  unprocessed  agricultural  products,  basic 
consumption goods such as paper products, shoes, wearing apparel…,) for domestic use 
and export. The economy has to import complex and refined commodities from the more 
advanced  economies.    At  time  t1  the  developing  economy  start  producing  some  of 
complex  commodities  by  importing  foreign  technologies  and  capital  (processed 
agricultural  products,  electronic  products,  auto  parts  ...).  In  parallel  with  producing 
complex consumption goods the economy gradually produces simple capital goods such 
as mechanical equipments. The sequence of industrial upgrading in capital goods sector 
takes similar shape as depicted in figure 1. By learning-by-doing and localizing, domestic 
production gradually drives out imports and start exporting to more advanced economies 
at  time  t3.  The  refined  commodities  which  require  core  technologies  and  capacity  of 
blueprinting  follow  the  same  path  but  take  longer  time  from  import  to  domestic 
production and from domestic production to export. By moving up to producing more 
technology-intensive commodities, the developing economy lifts itself up to advanced 
economy.  Consequently,  the  economy  stops  exporting  crude  commodities  and  even 
imports those commodities for producing complex and refined goods.   
  6 












Figure 1: Sequence of industrial upgrading predicted by flying geese paradigm 
The leap from import to domestic production depends crucially on transfer of 
technology. The mechanism of technology transfer, however, has not been mentioned 
explicitly in “flying geese” model by Akamatsu and his advocators. The advocators of 
“flying  geese”  presume  that,  the  competition  from  foreign  exporters  can  effectively 
activate the sense of urgency to catch up (or instigate the animal spirit) among local 
producers. Yet, it remains unclear how local firms that have been impoverished due to the 
competitive  pressures  of  imports  could  overcome  their  overwhelmingly  unfavorable 
situation. While imported products may expand consumer tastes and local firms may find 
new niches, the negative effects of competition caused by imported products can be so 
devastating that local firms may be totally crowded from the market, thus leading to the 
monopolization by imported products. In other words, when the local firms are totally 
eliminated and/or the local market is extremely small and unable to create any room for 
local firms, the question of who in the local market can pursue this possibility arises. 
Ozawa (1991) argues that transnational corporations (TNCs), particularly those 
from Japan, would play a vital role in technology transfer through FDI. In addition to 
FDI, Ozawa identifies other channels which facilitate inter-economy industrial relocation: 
licensing,  subcontracting,  technical  assistance  contracts,  turnkey  operation,  market 
agreements (especially easier access to the leaders markets), financial loans, and official 




t1  t2  t3  t  t4  
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industrial upgrading occurs along the correct inter-economy sequence, TNCs do facilitate 
the restructuring of the economies of home and host economies. 
Economic  integration  in  the  region  which  is  led  by  TNCs,  helps  the  orderly 
progress of all members of the flock and the emergence of a hierarchically organized 
regional division of industrial labor. The involved economies could avoid the situation of 
too many being engaged simultaneously in export-oriented production for a narrow line 
of product groups. FDI from more advanced economies, on the one hand, could help 
them remain competiveness by relocating to developing economies those industries and 
activities that have lost international competitiveness. This relocation, on the other hand, 
would  help  transfer  technologies  that  are  needed  for  upgrading  export-oriented, 
competitive industries in developing economies. 
In  essence,  the  “flying  geese  paradigm”  advocates  an  orderly  progress  of  the 
whole flock (East Asian economies). All economies in the flock involve in a collective 
catching-up process as a group, it does not mention how one member of the flock can 
move  forward  relatively  to  others  in  the  flock.  In  industrial  level  each  member 
participates in one link in a production networks which led by a flagship firm from the 
most advanced economy (e.g. Japan). The flagship firm control core technologies and 
marketing network, middle layers manufacture parts and components. Less developed 
economies like Vietnam participate in the bottom layers doing assembly and packing 
(Figure 2). In this sense, the regional industrial restructuring process is characteristically 
a top-down one; the industrial restructuring in followers’ economies initiated by leader’s 
perceived imperative for their own internal restructuring, the followers lose their own 
initiatives.    
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Figure 2: Orderly progress of the flock in a production network 
It  is  worth  noting  that  originally  the  “flying  geese  paradigm”  that  Akamatsu 
proposed for Japan’s policies to catch-up with western economies is a bottom-up process: 
“the  catching-up  process  is  reflection  of  the  follower  economy’s  development 
aspiration”. As soon as this paradigm was exported out of Japan, contemporary theorists 
(Japanese)  advocated  the  top-down  approach  with  Japan  play  the  leading  role  in  the 
region.         
2.2  Vietnam’s economic performance since Doimoi 
2.2.1  Overall view 
Thanks  to  the  determined  and  comprehensive  economic  reforms,  including 
international economic integration, as well as positive impacts of high growth in its major 
trade partners, Vietnam achieved huge successes in a number of socio-economic aspects. 
In the years 1986-2008, GDP growth accelerated, from almost 3.6 percent in 1987 to 8.5 
percent in 2007, and contracted to 6.18 percent in 2008  which partially affected by the 
subprime crisis. Annual average growth rate in the same period is 6.95%. 
The  share  of  agriculture-forestry-fishery  sector  went  down  continuously  from 
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industry-construction  sector  as  a  whole  decreased  from  28.36  percent  in  1986  to  the 
trough of 22.67 percent in 1989 and kept on increasing since then to about 41.6 percent in 
2008. The share of the services sector, meanwhile, kept on going up from 31.08 in 1986 
to the peak of 44.06 percent in 1994 then has been relatively stable around 40 percent 
from that on (figure 3). Growth of the industry-construction sector has always been the 
fastest, on average the annual growth rates of Agriculture, Industry, and Service during 
period 1986-2008 are 3.8%, 9.22 and 7.35% respectively. Hence, since Doi moi Vietnam 
has not only consecutively archived high growth rate of GDP but also has changed its 
economic  structure  towards  to  a  more  industry-and-service-led  one.  In  which  the 
industry-construction sector has always been the driver of growth and a positive shifter of 
economic structure over the period. 
Figure 3: Structural change 








































































































Source: Calculated from GSO 2008 and CEIC data base. 
As depicted in Figure 4, Vietnam’s trade has also expanded continuously during 
the period of 1986-2008. The GDP growth seems being driven by international trade. It 
evidenced that Vietnam has increasingly integrated into the international economy since 
1986; both exports and imports have risen at impressive paces, with the annual average 
growth rates during period 1986-2008 are 19% and 15% respectively. Initially, Vietnam 
had to import much more than its export (in 1986 the Vietnam exported 789.05 million 
USD while it imported 2155.1 billion USD). Consequently, even on the average, the 
annual growth rate of export is higher than that of import, Vietnam still suffers huge trade 
deficit ; in 2008 the real trade deficit reached 16.619 billion USD (in 2005 price).  
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Source: CEID and GSO 2008 for GDP growth, Import and export in current USD. The author 
use US’s GDP deflator (World Bank 2009) to calculate real growth rates of Imports and Exports. 
Figure 5: The coefficient of variation of growth of GDP and ex port 
















Vietnam Thailand Indonesia Malaysia S. Korea
GDP  Export
 
Source: Calculated from GSO 2008, CEIC Database for Vietnam and World bank 2009 
for other countries. 
Interestingly,  though  Vietnam’s  economy  deeply  integrated  into  international 
economy and export and import are quite volatile, the GDP growth is rather stable during 
the period 1986-2006. More specifically, during the period of 1986-2008 the coefficient  
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of variation of growth rate of GDP, export and import are 0.26, 0.88 and 1.1 respectively.  
In  the  same  period,  its  neighboring  economies  Thailand,  Indonesia,  Malaysia  and  S. 
Korea also faced high volatility of export growth, especially Indonesia and S. Korea. The 
volatility of Vietnam’s export is even higher than Thailand’s and Malaysia’s. However, 
Vietnam’s GDP growth is much more stable than its neighboring economies (Figure 5). 
It is worth noting that, before the Asian crisis 1997, the performance of these 
economies is much better than Vietnam: higher growth and more stable (Table 1). After 
having  escaped  from  crisis,  since  1999  these  economies  have  not  yet  gained  their 
previous  level  of  growth  rates  and  they  also  suffer  from  more  volatility  in  growth. 
Interestingly, although in the post-crisis period Vietnam’s economy has integrated into 
the international economy much more than it did in pre-crisis period, its growth rate in 
the  later  is  higher  and  more  stable  in  the  former.  This  partially  due  to  prior  1997 
Vietnam’s  economy  was  still  in  the  initial  stage  of  integration  into  the  international 
economy, hence it was less affected by the crisis. In the post-crisis period Vietnam have 
made used of the region’s recovery momentum and gained high growth rate. Table 1 also 
shows that the more stable, the higher the economy grows.    
Table 1: GDP growth and its coefficient of variation in different periods 
Periods    Vietnam  Thailand  Indonesia  Malaysia  S. Korea 
Growth  6.95  5.81  5.18  6.24  6.34 
1986-2008 
C.V.  0.26  0.83  0.84  0.62  0.61 
Growth  6.74  9.13  7.51  8.32  8.56 
1986-1996 
C.V.  0.35  0.26  0.17  0.33  0.22 
Growth  7.19  4.74  4.71  5.54  5.27 
1999-2007 
C.V.  0.16  0.32  0.34  0.38  0.45 
Source: cited in figure 4 
On the investment side, foreign capital also plays an important role in Vietnam’s 
economy since Doimoi.  The FDI growth (real implemented capital) and GDP growth 
that  depicted  in  Figure  6,  look  moving  with  akin  rhythm.  In  period  1991-1995  FDI 
(implemented capital) increased dramatically, with more than 40% of annual growth rate. 
The GDP growth rate was more than 8% yearly in the same period. The effect of Asian 
crisis 1997 was evidenced in the growth rate of FDI in period 1996-1999; the growth rate  
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of FDI slowed down from 4.3% in 1996 to -24.85% in 1998 and -2.8% in 1999. The GDP 
growth declined steadily to 4.77% in 1999. The years 2000-2003 saw FDI inflows to 
Vietnam  being  recovered  but  quite  stagnant.  The  decreasing  trend  stops  in  1999  and 
slightly recovered in 2000 with growth rate of 1.18%. However, up to 2004, the growing 
trend was not clear. The unattractiveness of Vietnam’s investment environment relative 
to other countries in the region, especially to China is one of the key explanations for this 
situation  (Nguyen  Thi  Tue  Anh  2005).  Notwithstanding  the  decrease  in  implemented 
capital, the number of new FDI projects went up continuously, from 285 to 791 in period 
1998-2003.  





































FDI growth Real GDP growth
 
Source: GSO in various issues, and the author uses US’s GDP deflator (World Bank 2009) to 
calculate real number. FDI growth is referred to left axis, GDP growth is referred to right axis.  
Since 2004, FDI inflows into Vietnam started to go up. The growth rate steadily 
increased from 4.65% in 2004 to 90.4% in 2007 and slightly slowed down to 41.34% in 
2008. The number of new projects increased from 811 in 2004 to 1544 in 2007, and 1171 
in 2008. Total FDI registered capital also rose from over USD 4.5 billion in 2004 to 
above USD 21.34 billion and USD 64.011 billion in 2007 and 2008, respectively. The 
high increase in FDI inflows in this period could be attributed to the improved investment  
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environment  after  revising  the  Foreign  Investment  Law
6,  and  the  Government’s 
permission for foreign investors to invest in some previously-Government-monopolized 
industries e.g. electric supply, insurance, banking, communication (Nguyen Thi Tue Anh 
2005).  Furthermore,  the  years  2004-08  also  witnessed  greater  efforts  by  Vietnam  to 
promote investment inside and outside Vietnam. The GDP growth rate sturdily recovered 
since 2000 and reached the peak of 8.48% in 2007 before slowed down to 6.15% in 2008 
due to effect of subprime crisis.    
2.2.2  A closer look 
Figure 7 depicts the shares of registered FDI inflows into Vietnam in the years 
1988-2008 by economies and region. The main source of FDI inflow into Vietnam over 
the past 20 years is from East Asian economies, which accounted for 65.08 percent of the 
total. Japan and four economies of first tier NIEs: Taiwan, S. Korea, Singapore and Hong 
Kong SAR, all accounted for lion shares in total FDI into Vietnam. Respectively, the 
shares of these economies are 10.61%, 12.81%, 10.19%, 10.43% and 4.53%. Two most 
advanced  economies  of  second  tier  NIEs,  Malaysia  and  Thailand  have  also  taken 
significant part. The share of Malaysia’s is 11%, alike those of Taiwan and S. Korea. 
It should be noted, however, that this comparison only takes into account direct 
amount of registered capital, rather than the origin of investment or actually implemented 
capital. Due to data unavailability, similar comparison using implemented capital is by no 
means possible, despite its greater informational value. Besides, registered capital only 
considers direct registration by foreign enterprises, without caring for the actual origins 
of their capital. Taking this problem into account, the rankings would be dramatically 
different. For example, the joint study by MPI/FIA and USAID/STAR in 2005 figured 
out that taking actual origin of capital will bring the US to the first place, as much of the 
investment  capital  from  the  US  were  channeled  to  a  third  country  before  reaching 
Vietnam.
7 
The majority of FDI projects and registered capital concentrated in industry and 
construction,  whilst  those  into  agriculture-forestry-fishery  were  rather  limited.  The 
industry-construction sector accounted for 68 percent of FDI projects, and 65 percent of 
FDI  registered  capital.  Meanwhile,  the  agriculture-forestry-fishery  only  attracted  7 
percent of FDI projects and 4 percent of FDI registered capital. It can be seen then that 
the agriculture-forestry-fishery sector has been relatively disadvantaged in attracting FDI 
                                                 
6 Before the enactment of the Law on Investments 2005 and Enterprise Law 2005, foreign investors and 
foreign invested enterprises were regulated differently from domestic investors and national invested 
enterprise by separate laws. In 2005 these discriminations were removed, foreign investors and national 
investors are all regulated by Common Law on Investment and Unified Enterprise Law.    
7 In the period 1988-June 2006, US-related registered FDI is found to be twice as large as US-reported 
registered FDI (STAR, CIEM, and FIA 2007).  
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inflows. Notwithstanding its important role in Vietnam’s socio-economic development, 
the sector and their farmers/workers appears to enjoy relatively less benefits from FDI 
attraction than those in other sectors. The services sector made up shares of 25 percent in 
total projects, and of 31 percent in total registered capital. This situation will expectedly 
change in a dramatic way over the forthcoming years, as Vietnam is set to open up its 
services sector to fulfill its WTO commitment. Specifically, more FDI projects in the 
services  sector,  particularly  ones  with  high  value  added  and  profitability,  will  be 
expected. 
 
Figure 7: Share of registered FDI by economies and region in the total: % 
Hong Kong 
SAR, 4.53
China, 1.34 Japan, 10.61 S. Korea, 10.19
Others, 34.92 Asean, 25.61
Taiwan, 12.81
 
Source: GSO in various issues 
Together with their increasing presence, the FIEs are undertaking a greater role in 
Vietnam’s economy (Table 2). The share of FDI in gross investment went up from 18.0 
percent  in  2000  to  29.8  percent  in  2008.  The  number  of  employees  in  FIEs  rose 
continuously and accounted for 4 percent of total employees in 2008. The employees in 
domestic  private  firms  and  FIEs  altogether  accounted  for  more  than  two-thirds  of 
employees in the business sector (Dinh Van An 2009). FIEs are also producing greater 
values of industrial products. To date, it contributes more than 40.2 percent to Vietnam’s 
total industrial products. In another aspect, they are making greater contribution to GDP 
and budget revenues. Their share in the country’s budget revenues went up from 13.3 
percent to 17.7 percent in the years 2000-07 (Dinh Van An 2009)  
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Table 2: Shares of FIEs in Vietnam’s employment, GDP, industrial production, 
and total investment 
Unit: Percent 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Employment  0.99  1.16  1.49  1.91  2.29  2.66  3.08  3.49  4.00 
GDP (at 1994 
prices)  10.82  10.85  10.86  11.18  11.56  12.07  12.75  13.26  13.53 
Industrial output 
(at 1994 prices)  35.94  35.30  35.43  35.78  36.04  37.28  38.21  38.89  40.24 
Investment  18.00  17.60  17.40  16.00  14.20  14.90  16.20  24.80  29.80 
Source: GSO. 
Vietnam’s  imports  also  show  the  same  pattern  as  FDI:  East  Asian  are  the 
dominant  import  market  for  Vietnam  (Table  3).  The  shares  of  these  economies  in 
Vietnam’s import in the years 1998-2008 range from 73.65 percent to 79.19 percent of 
the total import. ASEAN as a whole has been the largest market for the whole period; 
their shares range from 23.56 percent to 29.44 percent, outdistance the runners-up whose 
shares  are  around  11  –  13  percent.  Japan,  Taiwan  and  South  Korea,  are  also  in  the 
dominant group, with more than 10 percent for each.  
Table 3: Shares of East Asian partners’ export in Vietnam import: percent of total  
  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
ASEAN  29.44  28.03  28.45  25.73  24.15  23.56  24.30  25.37  27.95  25.32  24.25 
Taiwan  11.98  13.34  12.02  12.39  12.79  11.54  11.57  11.71  10.75  11.02  10.36 
South Korea  12.36  12.65  11.21  11.63  11.54  10.40  10.51  9.78  8.71  8.50  8.75 
Hong Kong   4.85  4.30  3.82  3.31  4.08  3.92  3.36  3.36  3.21  3.09  3.26 
Japan  12.88  13.78  14.71  13.46  12.68  11.81  11.11  11.08  10.47  9.84  10.21 
China  4.48  5.73  8.96  9.90  10.93  12.43  14.37  16.05  16.46  19.92  19.39 
East Asia  75.98  77.83  79.19  76.42  76.18  73.65  75.22  77.35  77.55  77.69  76.23 
Euro zones*  17.05  16.69  14.97  15.25  14.08  13.90  12.83  11.78  12.55  13.07  12.03 
*  Euro  zone  here  includes  six  main  partners:  Germany,  France,  Italy,  Spain, 
Netherlands, and Belgium.  
Source: GSO 
This period saw the rapid of China. The share of China in 1998 is only 4.48 
percent, the figure rose dramatically to nearly 19.4 percent in 2008. The rise of China has 
gradually crowded out shares of the three East Asian economies and ASEAN economies. 
Even though these economies remain claim lion shares in total Vietnam’s import.  
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Figure 8: Share of capital goods and its components in total imports 
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Source: GSO and CEIC. 
The salient characteristic of Vietnam’s import is the domination of capital goods. 
In prior crisis period (1986-1997) capital goods accounted for a fairly stable share of 
around 85 percent of the total imports. In post-crisis period Vietnam increased its import 
of capital goods to more than 90 percent (Figure 8). It should be noted the expansion of 
share of import of capital goods in the whole period 1986-2008 is crucially ascribed to 
the expansion of imports of fuels and raw materials. It evidences that Vietnam has not 
improved  its  capacity  to  produce  inputs  for  production  since  1986  and  increasingly 
depends on imported inputs for production. Vietnam’s economy has grown in width not 
in depth since Doi moi. Data in Table 2 and in Figure 8 also imply that Vietnam has 
imported mainly capital goods from East Asia.  
In contrast to import, share of East Asian economies’ import to Vietnam total 
export steadily decreased from 55.45 percent in 1998 to 43.48 percent in 2008 (Table 4). 
The  ASEAN  continued  to  be  an  important  market,  they  absorb  around  16%  of  total 
Vietnam’s exports. South Korea, Taiwan, and China to some extent, exported largely to 
Vietnam in the years 1998-2008, however they absorbed quite small share of Vietnam’s 
exports. Fortunately, the declining of East Asia’s share has been offset by the increase of  
US market. Thanks to Vietnam-US bilateral trade agreement, which came into effect in 
2001 the US’s share increased steadily from 5.06 percent in 2000 to 20.8 percent in 2007  
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and slightly went down to 18.9 percent in 2008. Other important markets for Vietnam’s 
exports include, but are not limited to, Australia, The Netherlands, Germany, France, UK,  
Table 4: Share of East Asian partners’ import in Vietnam’s export: percent of total 
  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
ASEAN  21.56  21.79  18.07  16.98  14.57  14.65  15.28  17.70  16.64  16.09  16.22 
Taiwan  7.16  5.91  5.22  5.36  4.89  3.72  3.36  2.88  2.43  2.35  2.23 
South Korea  2.45  2.77  2.43  2.70  2.81  2.44  2.30  2.05  2.12  2.58  2.84 
Hong Kong   3.40  2.04  2.18  2.11  2.04  1.83  1.44  1.09  1.14  1.20  1.40 
Japan  16.18  15.48  17.78  16.70  14.59  14.44  13.37  13.38  13.16  12.50  13.58 
China  4.70  6.47  10.61  9.43  9.09  9.35  10.95  9.95  8.14  6.91  7.21 
East Asia  55.45  54.46  56.30  53.29  47.98  46.43  46.69  47.04  43.63  41.63  43.48 
Source: GSO 
  In  the  years  1997-2008  also  saw  the  gradual  expansion  of  exports  of 
manufacturing and semi-manufacturing (Figure 9).The share of manufacturing and semi-
manufacturing production increased from 31.64 percent and 15.38 percent in 1997 to 
48.35 percent and 24.26 percent in 2008 respectively. At the same time, the share of 
mining declined sharply from 15.94 percent in 1997 to 1.61 percent in 1998 and then 
stabilized around 1.5 percent in the following years. The share of agriculture and services 
in export of non-oil products also show declining trend in the period. This implies that 
Vietnam’s services industry is losing its international competitiveness in comparison with 
manufacturing industry.     
  Table 5 shows top 15 imports and exports of manufactured goods in Vietnam. The 
dominants of exports are low-tech products such as wearing apparel, metals and metal 
products.  Vietnam  also  exports  some  high-tech  products  like  machinery  used  for 
broadcasting, television and information activities, and other electrical machinery and 
equipment however as shown in next section, these products depend heavily on imported 
inputs and Vietnam just to conduct low-tech steps in the total value chain. It also worth 
noting that these main exports are also of advantages neighboring economies such as 
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Figure 9: Structure of non-oil exports 1987-2008 
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Source: GSO. 
2.3  Is there any technological improvement 
Based on Standard Industry Classification (SIC 3.0) by United Nations and 
database from General Statistics Organization (GSO) we, in this study, classify 
Vietnam’s industrial commodities into two groups: the high-tech (whose codes in SIC 3.0 
are 24, 29, 30, 31, 42, 33, 34, and 35 ) and low-tech (the left) 
Table 5 shows that between 1999-2008 ratios of output and value-added of high-
tech commodities to those of the whole industry in Vietnam were in upward trends. 
Specifically, in comparison with the ratio of value-added, the ratio of output increased 
more quickly and sturdy (from 19.65 percent in 1999 to 23.99 percent in 2008). The ratio 
of value-added slightly improved but the increment is trivial and not steady. In general, 
Vietnam’s industry has expanded its production of high-tech in relative to production of 
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Table 5: Ratio of output and value-added (%) 
    1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
high-tech  19.65  19.84  20.62  21.53  21.64  21.97  22.71  23.18  23.56  23.99 
Output 
low-tech  80.35  80.16  79.38  78.47  78.36  78.03  77.29  76.82  76.44  76.01 
high-tech  18.31  17.80  18.38  19.07  18.52  18.15  18.23  19.10  19.46  19.67  Value 
added 
low-tech  81.69  82.20  81.62  80.93  81.48  81.85  81.77  80.90  80.54  80.33 
Source: GSO 
On international trade, figure 9 shows the slow movement of exports. The export 
of high-tech products is still very modest, just around 13 percent. However, the bright 
aspect is that from 2000 on, the ratio of high-tech exports to total exports of industrial 
goods has increased fairly steadily.  
In general, in the last 10 years Vietnam’s industry has improved slowly towards 
high-tech ends. However, this point should be considered with caution. Table 7 also 
shows that the contribution of high-tech industries to the value-added of the whole 
industry is almost unchanged in the same period. At the same time, the ratio of high-tech 
output to output of the whole industry steadily increased from 19.65 percent in 1999 to 
23.56 percent in 2007.   
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Source: GSO  
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Hence, the industry of Vietnam is mainly low-tech which more than 80 percent of 
value-added is contributed by low-tech industries and this situation almost unchanged in 
the last decade. This implies that although, in appearance, Vietnam’s industry has moved 
slowly towards high-tech industry in the last 10 years, in essence, it has not. The value-
added per unit of output has consecutively declined in the same time.  
2.3.1  Imported intermediaries 
Figure 11 below shows that proportions of value-added to output of low-tech and 
high-tech products have been at low level: around 30 percent for low-tech products and 
23 percent for high-tech ones. Moreover, these ratios consecutively decreased in the 
period 1999-2007, in which the latter decreased faster than the former. This implies that 
the industry in Vietnam depends heavily on imported inputs and this situation has not 
been improved in the last 10 years but got worse.  Furthermore, small value-added of 
high-tech products that produced in Vietnam also indicates that, in essence, Vietnam just 
produces low-tech parts in the whole production chain of those high-tech products. 
Vietnam has not yet taken high-tech parts which give higher value-added.  
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2.3.2   Labor and capital income 
Let’s define:  
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h h h h h h
t t t t t t Y L w K r VC = + +   (1) 
be output of high-tech industries at time t;. 
 
l l l l l l
t t t t t t Y L w K r VC = + +   (2) 
be output of high-tech industries at time t. 
Where L, K, VC, w, and r are labor, capital, variable costs, wage and interest rate of capital used 
in production respectively; indexes h and l denote for high-tech  and low-tech. 
Theoretically, high-technology uses inputs more efficiently by improving 
productivity of labor and capital, hence is classified into three types: (i) the labor-
augmenting; (ii) the capital-augmenting; (iii) and Hicksian neutrality.  
In empirics, the high-tech industries are characterized by: 







<   
- if high-tech industries are labor augmenting, share of labor income in output 
would be higher than that in low-tech ones: 
h h l l
t t t t
h l
t t
L w L w
Y Y
>   
- if high-tech industries are capital augmenting, share of capital income in output 
would be higher than that in low-tech ones: 
h h l l
t t t t
h l
t t
K r K r
Y Y
>  
- if high-tech industries are Hicksian neutrality both shares are better than the 
correspondents in low-tech industries. 
   Table 6: Proportion of labor income and capital income in output (%) 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
High-tech  14.84  14.60  14.18  13.58  12.99  12.50  12.15  11.82  11.51 
Labor 
Low-tech  12.22  12.03  11.73  11.38  11.50  11.64  11.73  11.10  10.59 
High-tech  11.11  10.98  10.68  10.34  10.11  9.73  9.19  9.31  9.16 
Capital 
Low-tech  14.22  13.81  13.42  13.16  13.45  13.67  13.82  13.46  12.86 
High-tech  74.05  74.42  75.14  76.08  76.9  77.77  78.66  78.87  79.33 
VC 
Low-tech  73.56  74.16  74.85  75.46  75.05  74.69  74.45  75.44  76.55  
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  Source: GSO. 
Table 6 shows that the proportion of variable costs in output is higher in “high-
tech industries” than in “low-tech industries”. It means that “low-tech industries” use 
inputs more efficient than the “high-tech industries”. Hence the so called “high-tech 
industries” are not real ones in Vietnam. 
In addition, shares of labor income and capital income kept decreasing since 1999 
in both groups. It implies that in the last ten years technological progress in both groups 
of industries has not been evidenced.   
The implication is that Vietnam just participates in low-tech stage in producing 
high-tech products, which use mostly labor and low-tech capital. The worse thing is that 
this situation seems getting worse in last ten years. 
2.3.3  Prices 
 


















In period 1999-2007 prices of low-tech products increased 150% while prices of high-
tech products increased only 126% at the same time (figure 12). Furthermore, in the 
whole period the growth of prices of high-tech products is always lower than the growth 
of prices of low-tech. It means that the relative prices of high-tech products consecutively 
declined in the same period. This is partly due to fast improving productivity in high-tech 
industries in international market. If the growth of productivity in Vietnam is lagged  
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behind the international growth rate, Vietnam’s high-tech industries will have to face 
with adverse relative prices. Accordingly, investment in high-tech industries in Vietnam 
is less and less profitable than investment in low-tech industries. Unfortunately, the 
previous sections indicate that this seems be the case for Vietnam’s industry.   
2.3.4  Total factor productivity  
Hence, these reforms are expected to increase Hicks-neutral productivity, which 
will be examined in section result. In the model used for examining TFP growth and 
production specification will be presented in following section. 
Consider an aggregate production function mapping capital Kt and labor Lt, into 
output  Yt.  Assume  that  capital  and  labor  are  assumed  internally  homogeneous  and 
continuously substitutable factors of production. The production function is assumed to 
be twice differentiable and linearly homogeneous. 
, ( ) t t t t Y A F K L =        (1) 
where Qt, Kt, Lt are the level of output, capital stock and employed labour respectively, 
and At  is level of technology at time t .  F(.)  is homogeneous degree one. 
Ravankar (1971) and Bairam (1989) suggest the production function 
1 t a k
t t t t Y A K L e a b - =     (2) 
 ￿  is defined as substitution parameter. 
This specification (see Bairam [1989]) works well in estimating the production function 
of  Japan's  economy  in  industrializing  period  1878-1939.  Vietnam  also  started 
industrializing her industry since 1986, hence in this study I also apply this specification 
to estimate Vietnam's production function in period 1986-2007. 
If   0, b =   the production function is a Cobb-Douglass form, if   0, b ¹   the production 
function is a variable elasticity of substitution (VES) one. 
 
In this study the TFP growth is assumed to be driven by learning-by-doing and other 
exogenous  factors.  The  concept  of  learning-by-doing  was  firstly  incorporated  into  a 
macroeconomic  model  by  Arrow  (1962).  In  his  model,  part  of  the  technical  change 
process does not depend on the passage of time as such but develops out of experience 
gained within the production process itself. Mathematically, the model assumes that a 
labour  efficiency  index  associated  with  workers  of  a  particular  vintage  is  a  strictly 
increasing  function  of  cumulative  output  or  gross  investment.  Such  a  relationship  is 
expressed as .   
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0 t t A A E q =       (3) 
where   0 A   is the initial level of technology.  t E  is the index of experience at time t  and  
0 q >   is the learning coefficient. 
Arrow (1962) chooses cumulative gross investment as index of experience ( t t E I = S ) 
while other studies (Bairam 1987, Stokey and Lucas 1989) favored cumulative output as 
an  index  ( t t E Q = S )  Arrow  (1962)  argued  that  the  appearance  of  new  machines 
provides  more  stimulation  to  innovation  while  cumulative  output  is  less  inspiring  to 
innovation. In this study both measures are used as proxies of experience. As mentioned 
above, technological progress is not assumed to be wholly the result of learning-by-doing 
but other exogenous factors. The technological change index, , t A  is specified as follows: 
0
t
t t A A e E l q =       
    (4)
 
where l  is Hicks-neutral rate of exogenous technological change which is a function of 
time. 
In summing up, the VES production function in which technological progress is partly 
exogenous and partly the result of learning-by-doing can be presented by 
1
0
t t a k
t t t t Y A e E K L e l q a b - =     (5) 
Based on this VES model, (Nguyen Tu Anh and Nguyen Thu Thuy 2009) using 
data in CEIC and their estimates of Vietnam’s capital stock, show that Vietnam economic 
growth in period 1986-2008 is essentially driven by high rate of capital accumulation. 
The examination shows that there is no evidence of effectiveness of learning-by-doing in 
Vietnam between 1986-2007. Averagely TFP contributes negligibly to economic growth 
in the whole period (Table 7). 
Table 7: Contribution to economic growth 1986-2007 (%) 
Year  GDP Growth  Capital  Labour  TFP 
1986  2.79  4.99  1.29  -3.49 
1987  3.58  5.70  1.38  -3.49 
1988  5.14  5.11  1.42  -1.39 
1989  7.36  4.42  1.88  1.06 
1990  5.10  3.64  1.90  -0.45 
1991  5.96  4.26  1.03  0.67 
1992  8.65  4.66  1.22  2.76 
1993  8.07  6.70  1.33  0.05 
1994  8.84  6.59  1.42  0.83  
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1995  9.54  6.74  1.34  1.46 
1996  9.34  6.51  0.15  2.68 
1997  8.15  6.17  1.18  0.81 
1998  5.76  6.15  1.17  -1.56 
1999  4.77  5.42  1.15  -1.80 
2000  6.79  5.39  2.47  -1.08 
2001  6.89  5.13  1.38  0.39 
2002  7.08  5.27  1.33  0.48 
2003  7.34  5.33  1.47  0.54 
2004  7.79  5.29  1.36  1.14 
2005  8.44  5.28  1.23  1.93 
2006  8.23  5.30  1.04  1.88 
2007  8.48  6.08  1.05  1.36 
     
Vietnam  seems  repeat  the  growth  story  of  NIEs  in  period  1965-1986  which 
described  by  Krugman  (1997)  "it  (high  growth  rate)  was  due  to  forced  saving  and 
investment, and long hours of works..." Krugman's [1997] interpretation of these results 
is very pessimistic since, according to him, the lack of technical progress will inevitably 
bound  the  engine  of  growth  as  a  result  of  the  diminishing  returns  affecting  capital 
accumulation. However these signals should be taken as a warning not a worrying. Since 
for long period up to 1986 TFP contributes nothing to growth in NIEs, from 1986 on Lau 
and Park (2003) finds firm evidences of positive contribution of TFP to growth in these 
economies. "It is possible that the potential to adopt knowledge and technological from 
abroad depends on a country's stage of development. Growth in the early stages may be 
primarily  associated  with  physical  and  human  capital  accumulation,  and  significant 
potential for growth through catch-up may only emerge once a country has crossed some 
development threshold" (Collins and Bosworth [1996]). Cuong Le Van et al (2010) show 
that in a developing country with three sectors: consumption goods, new technology, and 
education, the productivity of the consumption goods depends on a new technology and 
skilled labor used to produce this new technology. In the ﬁrst stage of economic growth, 
the  country  concentrates  on  the  production  of  consumption  goods;  in  the  second  the 
country  must  import  both  physical  capital  and  new  technology  capital  to  produce 
consumption goods and new technology; in the third, the country must import capital and 
invest in the training and education of high skilled labor.  
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It is obviously Vietnam now is in initial stage of development process. Negligible 
contribution of TFP to growth is justifiable. However, in the long run Vietnam needs to 
reverse this trend to sustain economic growth. The lessons from NIEs indicate that this 
reverse process essentially requires increasingly improved human capital and capacity of 
R&D. 
2.3.5  Remarks: 
In  general,  Viet  Nam  is  following  a  similar  economic  pattern  experienced  by 
other East Asian economies, “flying geese”, but still is at an earlier stage of regional 
integration. 
- Firstly, the East Asian economies began their growth relying strongly on exports 
of labor- intensive products but they have gradually gained a comparative advantage shift 
to  increasingly  capital  and  technology-intensive  products.  At  present,  Viet  Nam’s 
manufacturing exports are concentrated in labor-intensive products such as textiles and 
garments, footwear, and furniture with low value added in the production value chains. 
- Secondly, East Asia has become the largest source of Viet Nam’s imports of 
capital goods for industrial production. However East Asia do not serve as main market 
for  Vietnam‘s  exports,  a  majority  of  the  markets  for  the  final  products  is  still  extra-
regional. The significantly increasing role of the EU and the US as important destinations 
for Viet Nam’s exports can also be seen in the case of Viet Nam. China has played an 
increasing role as a trade partner, especially in intermediate goods and components in 
East  Asia.  China  has  also  become  a  key  trade  partner  of  Viet  Nam,  but  with 
characteristics of the “North–South” trade and a huge deficit on Viet Nam’s side. 
- Thirdly, Vietnam’s industry has move slowly towards higher step on technology 
ladder. However, this movement is not a real one and characterized by followings: 
￿  Sluggish movement. 
￿  Proportions of value-added to output in both high-tech and low-tech industries 
steadily decline; high-tech industries decline faster. 
￿  Shortage of supporting industries causes low proportion of value-added to output 
in both industries. Vietnam’s industry not only depends heavily on imported 
machinery, instruments, and accessory but also increasingly depends on imported 
intermediaries. 
￿  Value-added in so-called “high-tech industries” are mainly generated at low-tech 
stage of production chain. In reality, Vietnam has not yet participated in 
producing of high-tech products. In the last 20 years, there is no evidence of  
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technological progress in Vietnam. The economy has just grown in width by 
spending more and more on physical capital, not in depth by improving 
productivity and technological capacity.  
2.4  Causality between foreign capital, exports and GDP 
In the current literature on Vietnam economic growth, most of published works 
presume that foreign capital and exports promote growth of GDP without clear evidence. 
Theoretically, the relationship between these variables is not necessarily unidirectional 
causality from FDI and exports to GDP. The causality relation may take place in opposite 
direction.  Recent  empirical  literature  shows  that  the  causality  relations  vary  with  the 
period studied, the econometric methods used, treatment of variables (nominal or real), 
one-way regression or two-way causality, and the presence of other related variables or 
inclusion  of  interaction  variables  in  the  estimation  equation.  The  results  may  be 
bidirectional, unidirectional, or no causality relations.  
Liu, Burridge, and Sinclair (2002) found bidirectional causality between each pair 
of real GDP, real exports, and real FDI for China using seasonally adjusted quarterly data 
from  January  1981  to  December  1997;  Kohpaiboon  (2003)  found  that,  under  export 
promotion (EP) regime, there is a unidirectional causality from FDI to GDP for Thailand 
using annual data from 1970 to 1999; Alici and Ucal (2003) found only unidirectional 
causality from exports to output for Turkey using seasonally unadjusted quarterly data 
from January 1987 to December 2002; Dritsaki, Dritsaki, and Adamopoulos (2004) found 
a bidirectional causality between real GDP and real exports, unidirectional causalities 
from FDI to real exports, and FDI to real GDP. for Greece, using annual IMF data from 
1960 to 2002; in addition, Ahmad et al. (2004) found unidirectional  causalities from 
exports to GDP and FDI to GDP for Pakistan using undeﬂated annual data from 1972 to 
2001.  Cuadros,  et  al.,  (2004)  found  unidirectional  causalities  from  real  FDI  and  real 
exports to real GDP in Mexico and Argentina, and unidirectional causality from real GDP 
to real exports in Brazil using seasonally adjusted quarterly data of Mexico, Brazil, and 
Argentina from late 1970 to 2000; Chowdhury and Mavrotas (2006) find unidirectional 
causality from GDP to FDI for Chile, and bidirectional causality between GDP and FDI 
in the case of Malaysia and Thailand using data from 1969 to 2000. Nair-Reichert and 
Weinhold (2000) found that the Holtz-Eakin causality tests show FDI, not exports, causes 
GDP using data from 24 developing countries from 1971 to 1995 applying mixed, fixed 
and random (MFR) effects model. 
Thus, it is very important that the assumptions, the treatment of variables, the 
sample period, estimation models and methods should be clearly indicated in the analysis. 
In any case, the general results appear to show the positive relation from FDI and exports  
  28 
(or trade) to GDP, and that the above brief survey also seems to indicate that there may 
be some interesting causality relations among exports, FDI, and GDP.  
In  this  section  we  shall  examine  the  causality  among  three  variables:  GDP, 
foreign capital and exports in Vietnam economy in period 1988-2008. Data are available 
in CEIC database and GSO (2004) in Vietnam Dong and measured by 1994 price.    
The econometric technique requires transforming the values of all real variables 
into their logarithmic values. The transformed level series are denoted by the lower case 
letters: gdp, ex, and fdi respectively for logarithm of GDP, exports and foreign capital 
(including FDI, ODA…). Thus, fluctuations of the variables are considerably mitigated. 
The econometric technique also calls for taking the ﬁrst-difference between consecutive 
logarithmic values, which are the same as the continuous growth rates of the variables, 
and are denoted by: dgdp, dex, and dfdi in this research. 
In this section, we explain the procedures of Granger causality relations between 
exports, foreign capital, and GDP for each economy using its time-series data. Before 
analyzing  the  causality  relations,  we  first  employ  the  unit  root  test  to  check  the 
stationarity of each series, and if needed, we then use the cointegration test among the 
three series. Based on the characteristics of the time-series data, we select either the level 
series or the first-difference series in the estimation of a vector auto-regression (VAR) 
model for Granger causality test. 
Unit root and Cointegration tests 
The most commonly used tests of the unit root in time-series are the Dickey–
Fuller (DF) test and the augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey & Fuller, 1979, 
1981; Said & Dickey, 1984). However, their test critical values (or p-values) for different 
small  sample  size  has  to  be  approximated  asymptotically  by  simulation  methods  
MacKinnon (1996), applying response surface analysis to annual data, calculated the test 
p-values (and critical values) for 20 observations. Since our sample has 21 observations, 
this paper uses MacKinnon’s p-values (or critical values) in the DF or ADF unit root test. 
While the DF or ADF unit root test has been the most commonly used test, there are 
some other tests which have higher power in the sense that the tests are more likely to 
reject the null hypothesis H0 of a unit root and accept the alternate Hypothesis H1 of no 
unit root. However the limitation of observations does not allow us to apply those tests 
such as DF-GLS test (Elliott, Rothenberg, & Stock, 1996) which requires at least 50 
observations. 
Table 8 presents the results from ADF unit root tests for level series and first-
deference series. 
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Table 8: ADF unit root tests for level series and first-deference series. 
Null Hypothesis: has a unit root 
  Level series  First difference series 
Series  k  t-statistics (p-value)  k  t-statistics (p-value) 
gdp  2  -0.8597 (0.7782)     
fdi  1  -9.8535 (0.000)*     
ex  1  -0.888576 (0.7703)     
dgdp      2  -2.9 (0.065)*** 
dfdi      1  -4.77 (0.0014)* 
dex      1  -5.33 (0.0004)* 
Notes: (1) The test equations include constant and linear trend. (2)  The lag length (k) is 
selected by the minimum AIC with maximum lag = 4. (4) *, **, *** denote rejection of null 
hypothesis at the 1%, 5%, 10% level of significance, respectively.  
On the left column of Table 8, for level series, the fdi is a stationary series but 
export (ex) and gdp are not stationary ones. Therefore we can not use the level series in 
the estimation of regressions for causality analysis. On the right column of Table 10, all 
the first-deference series are stationary series. 
Table 9: Johansen cointegration test summary. 
 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)   
         
          Hypothesized    Trace  0.05   
No. of CE(s)  Eigenvalue  Statistic  Critical Value  Prob.** 
         
          None *   0.914095   63.62544   29.79707   0.0000 
At most 1 *   0.581383   16.98978   15.49471   0.0296 
At most 2   0.023128   0.444599   3.841466   0.5049 
         
           Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
         
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
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Hypothesized    Max-Eigen  0.05   
No. of CE(s)  Eigenvalue  Statistic  Critical Value  Prob.** 
         
          None *   0.914095   46.63566   21.13162   0.0000 
At most 1 *   0.581383   16.54519   14.26460   0.0214 
At most 2   0.023128   0.444599   3.841466   0.5049 
         
           Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
 
Table 9 summaries the results from Johansen cointegration test. Both the trace test and 
the  maximum  eigenvalue  test  indicate  that  the  level  series,  ex,  fdi,  and  gdp,  are 
cointegrated. Based on the results from unit root tests and cointegration test, we have 
chosen to use the first-difference series in the estimation of the VAR model for causality 
test for Vietnam. 
The VAR model and Granger causality test 
   We have multi-variables, dex, dfdi, and dgdp, in the VAR( p) model to take into 
account  the  interactions  among  their  p-lag  variables  in  testing  the  Granger  causality 
relations. The VAR( p) model involves estimation of the following system of equations: 
 
  1 1 2 2 ... t t t p t p t y y y y µ ε − − − = +Λ +Λ + +Λ +   (6) 
where  t y   is  a  (3  x  1)  column  vector  of  the  endogenous  variables,  i.e., 
( , , ) t t t t y dgdp dfdi dex ′ = ,  t µ is  a  (3  x  1)  constant  vector,  p  the  order  of  lags,  each  of 
1 2 , ,..., p Λ Λ Λ is a (3 x 3) coefﬁcient matrix, each of   1 2 , ,..., t t t p y y y − − − is a (3 x 1) vector of 
the lag endogenous variables, and  t ε  is a (3 x 1) vector of the random error terms in the 
system. The lag length p in VAR is then selected by the minimum Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) with maximum lag equals to 3 since the numer of observation is limited 
only to 20. The results show that the optimal lag length is 3.  
Table 10 presents the estimated VAR models and the results of Granger causality 
test. The Granger causality relations are examined using the Wald test of coefﬁcients (F-
test), and each null hypothesis is indicated in the footnote of the table. 
The results in Table 10 show that there is a strong unidirectional causality from 
foreign capital to exports, unidirectional causality from foreign capital to GDP (at 5% 
level of significance) and a rather weak unidirectional causality from exports to GDP (at 
10% level of significance). These two causality relations indicate that exports and foreign  
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capital inflows join together to bring up the growth in GDP. These findings support the 
export-led growth and the FDI-led growth in Vietnam. 
Furthermore, the effects of foreign capital and export on GDP are independent: 
FDI  does  not  cause  export  and  vise-versa.  This  implies  that  FDI  inflow  to  Vietnam 
mainly to exploit domestic market not for foreign markets; the hypothesis of “FDI not 
help export” cannot be rejected. On the other hand, high growth rates of export in the last 
20 years have not been promotive factor for FDI inflow.  
Table 10: Vector Autoregression Estimates VAR (3) and Wald test of coefficient 
causality direction 
  
         
         
Coefficient  Endogenous 
variables   Dgdp  Dfdi  Dex 
         
          c1  DFDI(-1)   -0.00877  0.4458  -0.029 
  t statistics  -0.7255  1.12  -0.224 
         
c2  DFDI(-2)  -0.0136  0.054  0.09 
  t statistics  2.723  0.33  1.68 
         
c3  DFDI(-3)   0.0075  0.007  -0.04 
  t statistics  -1.928  0.055  -0.97 
         
c4  DEX(-1)  0.125  -0.1753  0.054 
  t statistics  2.698  -0.115  0.108 
         
c5  DEX(-2)  -0.0652  -0.572  -0.597 
  t statistics  -1.788  -0.477  -1.52 
         
c6  DEX(-3)  0.0021  -0.16  -0.34 
  t statistics  0.093  -0.213  -1.38 
         
c7  DGDP(-1)  0.0442  -3.08  0.073 
  t statistics  0.095  -0.2  0.0145 
         
c8  DGDP(-2)  0.757  10.6  4.533 
  t statistics  1.79  0.76  0.999 
         
c9  DGDP(-3)  -0.82  -8.345  1.82 
  t statistics  -2.223  0.688  0.46 
         
c  C  0.063  0.268  -0.15 
  t statistics  2.54  0.33  -0.56 
Ho  A  B  A 
Wald test 1 
F-stat  5.19 (0.034)**  0.51 (0.68)  1.48 (0.3)  
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Ho  B  C  C 
Wald test 2 
F-stat  3.63 (0.073)***  0.21 (0.88)  0.66 (0.6) 
         
           
Notes:(1) The p-values are in the parentheses. (2) In Wald test of coefﬁcients, for VAR(3), the 
null hypothesis A is c1=c2=c3=0, B is c4=c5=c6 =0, and C is c7=c8=c9 =0, respectively. (3)*, 
**,  ***,  denote  rejection  of  null  hypothesis  at  the  1%,  5%,  10%,  level  of  signiﬁcance, 
respectively. 
Notice that GDP does not cause foreign capital inflow and export. This implies that in 
general,  the  steady  economic  growth  in  Vietnam  during  period  1988-2008  is  not 
endogenized in the sense that inflow of foreign capital and exports during the period are 
crucial factors for economic growth, while economic growth seems not be a factor to 
promote  exports  and  inflow  of  foreign  capital.  These  unidirectional  causalities  may 
indicate that the economic growth in Vietnam in period 1988-2008 has not been based on 
productivity improvement but on resources such as cheap unskilled labor and low-tech 
activities  as  presented  in  previous  section.  Because  if  economic  growth  base  on 
incremental  productivity,  high  economic  growth  means  the  economy  is  getting  more 
productive, hence attract more foreign capital and exports become more competitive. If it 
was the case in Vietnam in period 1988-2008, the directional causality from GDP to 
foreign capital and exports should be evidenced. As far as these resources are exhausted, 
the fly-in foreign capital would cease, export would get stagnant, as a result the economic 
growth would be halted. In short, the result in table 12 shows that the economic growth in 
Vietnam cannot be sustained if Vietnam fails to improve its production capacity. 
3    Conclusion and policy recommendation 
Vietnam’s economy has gained fairly high growth rates over the last twenty years. 
The  relative  GDP  per  capita  to  US  has  shown  slightly  upward  trend  (Figure  13). 
However, in terms of catch-up, in 22 years from 1986 to 2007 Vietnam only upgraded its 
relative GDP per capita to United States from 4.65% to 8.18%. At the same time, South 
Korea increased its figure from 30.84% to 54.72%. Malaysia and Thailand also show big 
leap forward: from 20.66% and 13.99% to 41.7% and 22.6%. Vietnam’s performance 
slightly outweigh the performance of Indonesia. 
Figure  13  also  shows  that,  except  for  South  Korea,  Vietnam’s  neighboring 
economies seem getting stuck in middle-income trap for long time. The movement of 
Vietnam and its neighboring economies in Figure 13 indicates the orderly progress of the 
flock of East Asian economy: the whole flock moves forward, individual economy hardly 
move relatively to others members.  
The economic integration has been evidenced to strongly help economic growth 
in  Vietnam.  In  the  course  of  catching-up  Vietnam,  with  no  doubt,  needs  integrating  
  33 
deeper into international economy. However, Vietnam economic growth based crucially 
on  expansion  of  inputs  and  depended  heavily  on  imported  capital  goods  (machinery, 
instrument,  accessories,  raw  materials).  There  is  no  evidence  of  technological 
improvement  in  Vietnam  over  the  last  two  decades.  In  regional  integration  Vietnam 
mainly  servers  as  importing  market  and  assembling  factory  for  other  East  Asian 
economies, in contrast, these economies imported limitedly Vietnam’s commodities. This 
is opposite with what advocators of “flying geese” paradigm propose for less developed 
economies. The paradigm proposes that the international relocation of production of a 
particular product from a national economy must coincide with gradual reduction of its 
domestic  product.  The  original  exporting  economy  will  transfer  gradually  production 
process  to  the  importing  economy  and  eventually  import  that  product.  In  reality  we 
witness continuous the production in original exporting economy does not decline, TNCs 
from these economies only move simple part of production (assembling) to followers 
(like Vietnam) to enhance the competiveness of their exports by taking advantages of 
cheap  labor  and  other  inputs  (energy,  fee  of  environmental  protection,  etc.,)  in  less 
developed  economies.  Hence trade is increasingly a flow of  goods within production 
networks  that  are  organized  globally  rather  than  nationally.  Whether  any  territory  is 
included in or excluded from global networks depends on decisions of private actors. 
States can try to make their territory attractive but cannot dictate the structure of goods 
production  networks.  Consequently,  the  TNCs  control  almost  everything  such  as 
technology, marketing network, production structure…and they account for lion share in 
total value-added that created by the production chain. The followers only benefit a tiny 
share of value added, as the case of Vietnam.     
Figure 13: GDP per capita in PPP of selected countries relative to United States 
(%)  
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Source: Pennword table, US’s GDP is calculated in real USD and GDP of other countries 
is calculated in PPP by real USD. 
Yoshihora (1988) notes that “most of major components in automobile industry 
that first and second tier NIEs used are supplied by Japanese firms, some of which are 
produced  locally  under  their  technical  supervisors.  South  East  Asian  capitalists  are 
essentially distributors of Japanese cars with difference that they have assembly plants. 
Technologically,  however,  they  are  almost  100  percent  dependent  on  their  Japanese 
licensers  and  under  present  set-up.  It  would  be  impossible  for  them  to  become 
technologically independent; the technological dependence is not temporary but being 
structural semi-permanent.”  
As soon as Vietnam is locked in a hard structure of international production that 
controlled  by  TNCs,  it  hardly  improves  its  position  in  the  structure  since  this 
improvement  depends  essentially  on  TNCs’  decision.  For  example,  TNCs’  chose 
Thailand as the place to produce automotive components and spare parts, and Vietnam as 
an  assembling  factory.  Vietnam  hardly  be  able  to  upgrade  its  position  to  Thailand’s 
position, because this is costly for TNCs as they had invested largely in Thailand which 
can not be forgone. Furthermore, assembling factory does not require much investment,  
  35 
TNCs can easily leave the country when the business environment becomes unfavorable. 
It means that lower position suffers more uncertainty. 
In  Vietnam,  FDI  and  export  firmly  cause  economic  growth  but  there  is  no 
evidence of GDP causing FDI inflow and exports in Vietnam economy since Doi Moi. 
This  implies  that  over  the  last  two  decades  FDI  and  exporting  industry  in  Vietnam 
essential exploit its static advantages such as cheap labor, and raw material …Vietnam 
has not yet created dynamic comparative advantages such as high productivity of labor 
and capital.       
 Without  technological  improvement,  no  dynamic  comparative  advantage 
Vietnam’s  economic  growth  would  vanish  soon,  due  to  law  of  diminishing  marginal 
productivity. Hence, the most severe risk that Vietnam has to face in process of economic 
integration for development is the risk of being locked in “lame duck” position in the 
East Asian “flying geese”. Improving technological capacity and human capital stock is 
essential.  The  former  requires  technology  transfer  from  developed  economies.  This 
process is not automatic and constrained by severe conditions for developing economies.   
3.1  Constraints in technological acquisition 
In  principle,  economy  with  poor  resources  related  to  R&D  such  as  highly 
educated  human  capital,  stock  of  accumulated  knowledge,  broad  base  of  industrial 
foundation etc.,… hardly generates technology. A novel technology is firstly invented in 
a  developed  economy,  then  applied  to  produce  for  domestic  customers’  taste  for 
experiment and modification. At this stage price is inelastic due to monopoly and lack of 
standardization and information. Secondly, the matured products in domestic market will 
be exported to economies with similar level of income and taste. The super profit in 
monopoly markets induces competitor racing for that technology. Under competition, the 
inventing firm needs standardizing their product and moving part of production process 
to importing economy to reduce cost of production and maintain their competiveness. At 
this  stage  less  developed  economy  like  Vietnam,  is  probable  to  acquire  technology. 
However, due to standardization the crucial portion of production costs at this stage is 
marketing costs. Less developed economy usually lacks of distribution network, market 
relations,  therefore,  hardly  competes  with  developed  economy  even  they  are  able  to 
obtain and absorb technology.        
Technological transfer through FDI by TNCs does not occur automatically. In fact 
empirical  analysis  on  productivity  spillovers  from  FDI  has  found  relatively  limited 
positive  effects.  Hill  and  Athukorala  (1998)  shows  that  spillover  will  be  positively  
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associat  ned  with  competition  and  negatively  associated  with  the  productivity  gap 
between foreign and domestic firms; very large gap renders the technology absorption by 
domestic firms more difficult.  
Increasing  technological  complexity  make  the  technological  acquisition  more 
difficult:  higher  start-up  costs,  more  complicated  know-how  requirement,  steeper 
learning curve and more intensified specialization. In addition to TNCs’ reluctance to 
transfer technology as mentioned above, the original exporting state may be pressured to 
raise  trade  barriers  so  to  protect  the  declining  industries  under  the  so  called  “senile 
industry protection”. 
3.2  Policy recommendation 
Given its limited resource, Vietnam needs to identify and adopt an appropriate 
integration roadmap. As a member of ASEAN, Vietnam should continue to support and 
promote ASEAN integration, especially the materialization of the AEC, as well as East 
Asian integration in which ASEAN play a vital role. However Vietnam should not lock 
itself in the regional production network. Without competition between firms in various 
developed economies who hold technological capacity, Vietnam rarely is able to acquire 
technologies it needs. FDI policy should looks globally not regionally; attracting firms 
from advanced economic partners, i.e. those with strengths in investment, technology 
transfers,  and  human  resource  development,  etc  such  as  United  States,  EUs,  Russia 
etc.,…  should  put  in  priority.  In  this  line,  the  forms  of  bilateral  cooperation  can  go 
beyond the economic and trade arrangements. 
Vietnam  needs  to  find  itself  appropriately  positioned  in  the  game  to  reap  the 
benefits from a fast growing China, as well as in the regional production network in order 
to avoid the so-called “low cost labor trap”. There have been a number of opportunities 
for  Vietnam  to  enter  a  “win-win”  game  with  China.  For  instance,  China  has  a  huge 
market, with fast growth in economic size and consumption. Foreign investors also have 
high expectation of Vietnam’s growth prospects and many like to invest relying on the 
“China + 1” strategy. 
Over more than 20 years, Vietnam enjoyed high growth rate and a large amount 
of  capital  accumulated  in  the  economy.  The  immature  financial  sector,  choices  of 
financial assets are limited, hence the accumulated capital find their way in to bubble 
market  such  as  real  estates,  and  stock  market.  Financial  development  should  be 
accelerated to absorb those accumulated capital. More transparent in real estate sector is  
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crucial condition to reduce speculative activities and reverse capital to more productive 
activities and R&D. 
Educational and R&D activities should closely link with business sector.  
In long-term, to overcome the obstacle of core technology and marketing network 
Vietnam  needs  to  acquire  some  TNCs.  Hence,  in  medium-term  Vietnam  should 
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